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 In the wake of the events of September 2008, money market mutual funds have 
made significant changes to the way they invest. Those changes have been driven by 
business and investment needs as well as by substantial revisions to the regulatory 
framework in which funds operate. Yet, some policymakers and market participants are 
calling for additional regulatory or legislative action. This paper lays out the important 
role that money market mutual funds play in the short-term capital markets, traces the 
successful regulatory history of money market mutual funds and argues that suggested 
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I.  Introduction 
In the wake of  the 2008-2009 financial crisis regulators and market participants have 
been focused on the perceived vulnerability of money market mutual funds (MMFs) to 
systemic risk.  The Securities and Exchange Commission has begun to reassess the 
riskiness of MMFs.2  More recently, the Treasury Department directed the President’s 
Working Group (PWG) on Financial Markets to analyze how further to reduce the 
systemic risk that MMFs may pose to the economy.3 
The point of this Article is to analyze MMFs and to show that, viewed properly, such 
funds significantly reduce systemic risk.  Certain contemplated changes to the way that 
MMFs are regulated would increase systemic risk by weakening the role of MMFs in the 
money markets and increasing market participants’ reliance on commercial banks. 
In September 2008, there had been a “run” on certain MMFs when, after the collapse 
of Lehman Brothers, many investors rushed to redeem their shares. This influx of sellers 
caused concern that some MMFs would drop below their target price of $1.00 per share – 
an extremely rare occurrence known as “breaking the buck” that is highly unsettling to 
investors.  Though September 2008 marked only the second time in history that a MMF fell 
below $1.00 since the product’s creation in 1971,4 the occurrence provoked the SEC to 
                                                 
2 In response to the issues that affected money market mutual funds in late 2008 after Lehman Brothers’ 
bankruptcy filing, the SEC made significant changes to the regulation of such funds.  See Money Market 
Fund Reform, Inv. Co. Act Rel. No. 29,132 (Feb. 23, 2010), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2010/ic-29132.pdf. (accessed November 30, 2010); see also Benjamin 
Haskin, Margery Neale and Ryan Brizek, “SEC Adopts Money Market Fund Reforms,”  The Metropolitan 
Corporate Counsel, April 5, 2010, available at 
http://www.metrocorpcounsel.com/current.php?artType=view&artMonth=November&artYear=2010&Entr
yNo=10803, accessed  November 30, 2010. 
3 Report of the President’s Working Group on Financial Markets, “Money Market Fund Reform Options,” 
October, 2010. 
4 The first occurrence was in 1994 when concerns over exposures to interest rate derivatives led investors to 
withdraw from a particular fund that had taken excessive risk. 
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enhance its regulations of MMFs. Thus far, the SEC’s regulatory changes fall into three 
main categories: 1) enhanced risk limitations, 2) special provisions for MMFs that break 
the buck, and 3) more stringent constraints on repurchase agreements.5 Additional changes 
are being considered.  
This paper considers the role of MMFs in our financial markets and calls into 
question the assertion that these funds pose risks to the financial system. It proceeds first by 
demonstrating the centrality of mutual funds to our financial system and specifically the 
role of MMFs. Subsequently, the paper explains the operation of these funds in layman’s 
terms and the convenience they present to investors. It then proceeds to consider the role of 
these funds in the 2008 financial crisis. Having argued that MMFs did not cause or 
exacerbate the crisis, the paper highlights the advantages that MMFs bring to investors. 
Finally, it examines the current regulation of MMFs and further proposed changes. 
Ultimately, the paper argues that over-regulation of MMFs threatens to destroy their value 
and only to increase the systemic risks to society. 
An Introduction to Mutual Funds and Money Market Mutual Funds 
Mutual funds are investment vehicles (organized normally as a corporation or a 
business trust) that use the capital raised from the sale of shares to investors to construct a 
portfolio of investments. The returns to investors in the mutual fund are a straightforward 
function of the income and capital gains (or losses) of the mutual fund’s investment 
portfolio. The job of the fund manager is to invest the money received from the sale of 
these mutual fund shares appropriately in light of the structure of the fund and the 
investment objectives of the people whose money is being invested. Mutual funds play a 
                                                 
5 As summarized by the PWG. Money Market Fund Reform Options, Report of the 
President’s Working Group on Financial Markets, Oct. 2010 [hereinafter PWG Report]. 
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critical role in our economy. At the end of 2008, the United States had over 16,000 mutual 
funds with aggregate assets in excess of $9.6 trillion.6 For further perspective, mutual fund 
companies held 19% of the total financial assets of U.S. households, and invested on behalf 
of 45% of all U.S. households (92 million individuals, comprising 52.5 million 
households).7 As of October 2010, money market mutual funds had nearly $3 trillion of the 
total amount under management.8 Mutual funds are particularly popular in the United 
States, where roughly one-half of the world’s mutual fund industry is located.9  
The value of a share in a mutual fund is called the “Net Asset Value” of the fund. The 
Net Asset Value or “NAV” of a mutual fund is the net value of all of its assets 
(investments) divided by the number of shares outstanding. Thus, the NAV approximates 
the liquidation value of an investor’s shares in a fund. It is the price at which investors can 
buy fund shares or sell them back to the fund. The fund manager calculates the NAV of the 
fund each day and, when an investor wants his money back, the fund buys (or “redeems”) 
the investor’s shares at the price per share.  
Money market mutual funds – the target of the new SEC regulations – are a genus of 
“open-end” mutual funds. In an open-end mutual fund, the investors who put their money 
in such funds gain access to their money by “redeeming” their shares. Redemption is 
simply a demand by an investor to receive the cash equivalent of the investor’s shares.  
Money market mutual funds are known as such because they invest in what are 
known as “money market” instruments. These are securities with very short maturities that 
tend also to pose only negligible investment risk.  MMFs invest in short-term (one day to 
                                                 
6 INV. CO. INST., 2009 INVESTMENT COMPANY FACTBOOK: A REVIEW OF TRENDS AND ACTIVITY IN 
THE INVESTMENT COMPANY INDUSTRY 19, available at http://www.icifactbook.org/pdf/2009_factbook.pdf. 
7 Id. at 8 & 72-73. 
8 PWG Report, at 2. 
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397 day) debt obligations, such as Treasury bills, federal agency notes, certificates of 
deposit, commercial paper, and repurchase (or “repo”) agreements.10  (See Figure 1). 
Treasury bills are government promissory notes issued by the U.S. Treasury Department 
with maturity dates of up to one year; federal agency notes are securities issued to fund the 
operations of federal agencies, such as Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac (note that these 
short-term agency debentures are different from long-term agency mortgage-backed 
securities that consist of underlying residential mortgage loans); bank certificates of 
deposit (issued by both foreign and domestic banks) are bank-issued debt instruments that 
pay interest; commercial paper involves short-term obligations issued by banks and 
corporations; and repo agreements involve the buying of securities on a short-term basis 
coupled with an obligation by the original seller to repurchase the securities from the buyer 
at a fixed price at a later date. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
9 Id. at 20. 







Bill ions of dollars Billions of dollars Percentage  of total
Total taxable instruments $11,370 $2,361 21%
  Agency securities1 1,167 475 41
  Commercial paper 1,081 457 42
  Treasury securities2 2,578 382 15
  Repurchase  agreements3 2,559 449 18
  Certificates of deposit4 1,997 503 25













Source: Investment Company Institute 
 
MMFs are designed to serve the needs of investors whose primary goal is the 
preservation of principal, and who are willing to accept a modest return on their investment 
portfolio in return for more safety and liquidity.  From an economic perspective, MMFs are 
a substitute for the checking accounts offered by banks and provide consumers a viable 
alternative to banks.11  People who keep their money in MMFs, like those who keep their 
money in federally insured depository institutions such as commercial banks and credit 
unions, expect to be able to obtain cash from their funds virtually on demand, and they 
expect that the value of their investments will not decline in nominal terms.  
                                                 
11 RICHARD CARNELL, JONATHAN MACEY & GEOFFREY MILLER, THE LAW OF BANKING AND FINANCIAL 
INSTITUTIONS 604 (4th ed. 2009). 
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The moniker “money market” mutual fund distinguishes MMFs from the other sorts 
of mutual funds, which are designed more for long-term investors rather than for the 
short-term savers who typically patronize MMFs. The defining feature of a MMF and the 
characteristic that distinguishes MMFs from other mutual funds is that MMFs generally 
are able to maintain a stable NAV of $1.00 per share by keeping their risk exposures low 
and by buying short-term debt securities from issuers whose financial strength makes them 
highly unlikely to default prior to the date on which the securities mature.  
For all sorts of mutual funds, including MMFs, the Investment Company Act of 
194012 nominally requires that each fund calculate its NAV each day on the basis of the 
current market value of the securities held by the fund.  In the case of MMFs, however, the 
SEC has exercised its authority to carve out exemptions from this general rule. Under this 
exemptive authority, the SEC has ruled that under certain conditions, MMFs can employ 
accounting procedures to calculate the value of the securities they own which permit them 
to offer a stable share value of $1.00.  
In order to maintain a constant share value, most MMFs use the "amortized cost" 
method of valuation. Under this method securities are valued at acquisition cost rather than 
market value, and interest earned on each security (plus any discount received or less any 
premium paid upon purchase) is accrued uniformly over the remaining maturity of the 
purchase. By declaring these accruals as a daily dividend to its shareholders, the fund is 
able to maintain a stable price of $1 per share.13 
Money funds may also use a second procedure called "penny rounding" to maintain a 
stable share value, although I am not aware of any money funds currently relying on this 
                                                 




approach. Under this procedure the share value is calculated by rounding the per share 
market value of the fund to the nearest cent on a share value of a dollar. If the market value 
of a share is kept within one-half cent of a dollar, this accounting procedure allows the 
funds to offer a stable $1 share value. Thus, if a MMF has a net asset value of $0.995, the 
fund could quote a price of $1.00 because the SEC allows the $0.995 NAV (which is within 
one-half cent of a dollar) to be rounded up to $1.00. 
A large number of factors can cause the NAV of well-managed MMFs to fall below 
or rise above $1.00.  For example, a swift upward adjustment in interest rates could reduce 
the value of portfolio securities below the $1.00 NAV level. Some classes of assets held by 
the fund could decline in value. As the average maturity of the securities in a MMF’s 
portfolio increases, so too does the possibility that the NAV will vary somewhat from 
$1.00.14  Although most attention is paid to NAVs potentially falling below $1.00, a fund’s 
NAV could also exceed $1.00.   
Over time, two major customer constituencies for MMFs have emerged. One group 
of investors is individual (or “retail”) investors who use MMFs instead of, or as a 
supplement to, their demand deposit accounts and savings accounts. Retail investors also 
use MMFs to hold cash temporarily or to take a temporary defensive position in 
anticipation of declining equity markets. As of December 2009, about one fifth of U.S. 
households’ cash balances were held in MMFs.15 
The second core clientele of MMFs is large institutions, such as bank trust 
departments, corporations, brokerage accounts, state and local governments, hedge funds, 
                                                 
14 Id.     
15 See INV. CO. INST., 2010 INVESTMENT COMPANY FACTBOOK: A REVIEW OF TRENDS AND 




and retirement plans. The largest institutional investors in MMFs are corporations16 that 
purchase MMFs directly or indirectly through an intermediary and who use the funds for 
cash management purposes. A special category of MMFs, generally labeled 
"institutional-only," has evolved to deal with institutional investors. These funds offer an 
array of services specially designed to meet the needs of institutions, such as electronic 
hookups between the institutions and the fund and sub-accounting services to facilitate 
recordkeeping of banks’ trust accounts.17 Many corporate treasurers of large businesses 
have essentially “outsourced” cash management operations to money market mutual funds. 
As of January 2008, approximately 80 percent of U.S. companies used money 
market funds to manage at least a portion of their cash balances.18 U.S. non-financial 
businesses held approximately 32 percent of their cash balances in money market mutual 
funds. The prominence of institutional investors in MMFs is a relatively recent 
phenomenon. From 1998 to 2008, institutional money fund assets grew by 380 percent 
compared to 63 percent for non-institutional money fund assets.19  According to the 
Investment Company Institute (“ICI”), the national association of U.S. investment 
companies (including money market mutual funds), about 66 percent of money market 
fund assets are now held in money market funds or share classes intended to be sold to 
institutional investors.20 
MMFs typically require a minimum initial investment from clients in the range of 
$500 to $5,000 for retail investors.  MMFs geared towards institutions often have much 
                                                 
16 Id. at 181, tbl. 59. 
17 Cook and Duffield, supra note 12, at 159. 
18 See Inv. Co. Inst.,  Report of the Money Market Working Group, at 21 (Mar. 21, 2009), available at  
http://www.ici.org/pdf/ppr_09_mmwg.pdf (hereinafter “ICI Report”). 
supra note 7, at 28-29, Figure 3.7. 
19 See Inv. Co. Inst., Money Market Mutual Fund Assets, June 11, 2009 
http://www.ici.org/highlights/mm_06_11_09 (last visited April 24, 2010). 
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higher minimum initial investment requirements.  MMFs historically required customers 
to maintain fairly large balances, but that requirement has been relaxed over the past 
twenty years.  Retail MMFs typically permit their investors to write checks against their 
accounts, or to transfer funds electronically, though there may be restrictions on how many 
times per month such withdrawals can be made. 
While MMFs are the safest category of mutual funds, they historically have not been 
insured by the federal government. Because of the low risk associated with money market 
assets, such insurance never has been considered necessary.  Moreover, because MMF 
investors, like other mutual fund investors, are equity claimants and are entitled only to the 
NAV or their pro rata share of the value of the MMF’s assets, it is not possible for a mutual 
fund to fail in the way that a bank, whose depositors own fixed contractual claims for 
specific nominal sums, can fail. If a mutual fund’s assets decline in value, its investors face 
a similar decline in the value of their investments.  A bank depositor, however, is entitled to 
the same amount of money from the bank irrespective of any fluctuations in the value of 
the bank’s investments. 
It is possible, of course, for money market funds to suffer a decline in the NAV of the 
fund’s shares, which means that the NAV can fall to a price below $1.00 per share. But, 
because of the effective regulations governing MMFs, this risk has been, and remains, 
minimal.  Historically, even including consideration of the recent crisis, MMFs have been 
extremely safe.  
 
II. A Brief History of the Money Market Mutual Fund Industry 
 




MMFs date back to 1971 when the Reserve Primary Fund was launched.  MMFs 
experienced their initial period of rapid growth in 1974 and early 1975, as a result of 
Regulation Q’s strict ceiling on the interest rates that insured depository institutions were 
permitted to pay to depositors.21 In the high interest rate environment that existed during 
this period, money market rates of return rose well above the ceiling on interest that could 
be paid on deposits accounts. In order to outpace interest and achieve returns higher than 
those fixed by Regulation Q, many customers withdrew their assets from deposit accounts 
and placed their funds into money market mutual funds.22 
The level of MMF assets rose to almost $4 billion by mid-1975 and remained in the 
range of $3 billion to $4 billion until the end of 1977.23  Explosive growth in MMFs 
occurred again in the late 1970s and early 1980s, when very high money market rates 
produced large differences in the rates of return being paid by MMFs and depository 
institutions. Also beginning in the late 1970s, a few of the largest firms introduced the 
“cash management account” (CMA), a type of MMF that includes check-writing features. 
CMA accounts provided customers with both market-sensitive yields and the transactional 
                                                 
21 The Banking Act of 1933, Ch. 89, 48 STAT. 162, commonly known as the Glass-Steagall Act, enacted three 
major reforms that defined banking regulation for the next several decades: (1) the separation of banking 
from the securities industry; (2) the establishment of federal deposit insurance; and (3) federal controls over 
deposit insurance, including the prohibition of interest-bearing demand deposits. The third reform, proposed 
as the Glass provision and enacted as Regulation Q, set limits on the interest rates that banks could pay their 
depositors. For a treatment of the legislative history of Regulation Q, see R. Alton Gilbert, Requiem for 
Regulation Q: What It Did and Why It Passed Away, Feb. 1986 FED. RES. BANK OF ST. LOUIS REV. 22 (1986), 
available at: http://research.stlouisfed.org/publications/86/02/Requiem_Feb1986.pdf; Michael D. Schley, 
Interest on Demand Deposits: The Erosion of Regulation Q’s Last Stronghold, 4 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 23, 
29 (1985). 
22 See, e.g., Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Expansion of State Bank Powers, The Federal Response, and The 
Case For Preserving the Dual Banking System, 58 FORDHAM L. REV. 1133, 1143-44 (1990) (describing the 
impact of the Fed’s monetary policy on disintermediation); Laurie S. Goodman and Sherrill Shaffer, The 
Economics of Deposit Insurance: A Critical Evaluation of Proposed Reforms, 2 YALE J. ON REG. 145, 152 
(1984) (arguing that “whenever market interest rates rise about Regulation Q ceilings, bank deposits fall 
sharply.”). 
23 Cook and Duffield, supra note 12, at 157. See also Brian Reid, Inv. Co. Inst., Perspective: Growth and 
Development of Mutual Funds 3, available at http://www.ici.org/pdf/per03-02.pdf (analyzing the growth of 
money market mutual funds from 1970 to 2000). 
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advantages of a checking account, and as a result MMF assets rose rapidly from $4 billion 
in 1977 to $235 billion in 1982.24   
In order to help banks compete with MMFs, in 1980 Congress passed the Depository 
Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act (the “DIDMCA”), which created a 
committee charged with phasing out Regulation Q’s limitations on interest and dividends 
paid to depositors by 1986. Two years later, Congress passed the Garn-St. Germain 
Depository Institutions Act, which directed this committee to provide depository 
institutions with an account that would be “directly equivalent to and competitive with 
money market mutual funds.”25 These accounts, known as money market deposit accounts 
(MMDAs), had no limits on the interest depositors could earn. Both the instructions of the 
DIDMCA and the moniker chosen for these accounts indicate that they were designed in 
order to allow depository institutions to better compete with MMFs.26 
MMDAs were extremely successful at first, drawing $298 million within the first 
four months of their existence.27 The introduction of these accounts caused a predictably 
sharp drop in MMF balances; from November 1982 to the end of 1983, MMF assets fell by 
$67 billion.28  But over time the interest paid on MMDA accounts declined, and by 1986 
                                                 
24Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Transformation of the U.S. Financial Services Industry, 1975-2000: 
Competition, Consolidation, and Increased Risks, 2002 U. Ill. L. Rev. 215, n. 95 (2002); Cook and Duffield, 
supra note 12 at 157; Franklin R. Edwards & Frederic S. Mishkin, The Decline of Traditional Banking: 
Implications for Financial Stability and Regulatory Policy, FED. RES. BANK OF N.Y., ECON POL’Y REV. (July 
1995), at 31. 
25 12 U.S.C. § 3503(c)(1)(1982).  
26 See Timothy A. Canova, The Transformation of U.S. Banking and Finance: From Regulated Competition 
To Free-Market Receivership, 60 BROOK. L. REV. 1295, 1319-20 (1995) (discussing MMDAs in the broader 
context of the abolishment of virtually all restrictions on the price of credit during the Reagan 
administration). 
27 See Hans H. Angermueller, Vice Chairman, Citicorp-Citibank, Speech at The Thrift Industry at the 
Crossroads Conference: The Third Industry: A Breath of Fresh Air (Mar. 25, 1983), in 3 ANN. REV. BANKING 
L. 155, 160 (1984). 
28 Cook and Duffield, supra note 12. 
13 
 
MMF assets had returned to their 1982 levels.29  Since that time, MMF assets have 
continued to grow, not only as a result of their competitive rates of return, but also because 
investing in the stock market in general and the mutual fund industry in particular 
experienced significant growth. This has led to rapid growth because 
 
[I]nvestors often use MMFs as a parking place for cash 
reserves awaiting investment in longer-term financial assets 
such as stocks and bonds. They also frequently exchange 
MMF shares for the shares of other funds in their mutual 
funds group. Further, MMFs are generally the core vehicle 




Another important historical feature of MMFs has been the support that such funds 
have received from their mutual fund sponsors. Where there has been a risk of decline in 
the value of a particular class of mutual fund assets, some MMF’s advisors have averted 
the specter of breaking the buck by purchasing securities from the MMFs in an effort to 
bring the funds’ NAVs back to $1.00. This has been a considerable source of strength for 
MMFs and a significant source of comfort to MMF investors, despite the fact that advisors 
strive to make clear that there are no guarantees to support their funds.   
For example, in 1989, when a major commercial paper issuer defaulted on $213 
million of outstanding paper, two MMFs held enough of the issuer’s paper to jeopardize 
their ability to maintain a $1.00 NAV. The funds' advisors averted the possibility of a 
decline in the $1.00 share value by purchasing the commercial paper from the funds. A 
year later, two additional issuers defaulted on their commercial paper, and in this case as 
well, the advisors of MMFs holding these funds came to the rescue by purchasing the 
                                                 
29 Id.  
30 Id. at 159.  
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troubled commercial paper from the funds at a price sufficient to maintain the fund’s 
NAV.31 Despite the lack of any losses to investors, as a result of these problems in the 
commercial paper market, the SEC strengthened even further the restrictions on MMFs.  
In 1991, the SEC amended Rule 2a-7 of the Investment Company Act of 1940 to 
require MMFs that wanted to continue to use the amortized cost or penny-rounding 
accounting methods to comply with new maturity, credit quality and diversification rules. 
Specifically, the SEC ruled that the MMF had to invest 95 percent of its assets in 
 
"First Tier" securities, which generally speaking was 
defined to include Treasury securities or privately issued 
securities rated A1-P1, and had to invest the remainder in 
"Second Tier" securities, which are those rated A2-P2. The 
SEC also required that a fund invest no more than 1 percent 
of its assets in any particular Second Tier company or 5 
percent of its assets in any First Tier company. Finally, the 
SEC lowered the average maturity requirement from 120 to 
90 days.32   
 
At this time, the SEC promulgated its rule making it illegal for a registered mutual 
fund to describe itself as a “money market” fund unless it met the stringent requirements of 
Rule 2a-7. This provision effectively defined a money market fund as a mutual fund that 
follows the risk-limiting provisions of Rule 2a-7. And, significantly, since 1991 the SEC 
has required that a money market fund prospectus prominently disclose that the MMF's 
shares are neither insured nor guaranteed by the U.S. government and that there is no 
assurance that the funds will be able to maintain a stable value of $1 per share. The express 
                                                 
31 Id. 
32 Id.; see also, Leland Crabbe and Mitchell Post, The Effect of SEC Amendments to Rule 2a-7 on the 
Commercial Paper Market, Finance and Economics Discussion Series # 199, Washington: Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System (May 1992) (demonstrating the reduction in MMFs' holdings of 
A2-rated paper following the imposition of this regulation and conclude that the regulation raised the interest 
rate on A2 paper relative to the rate on A1 paper). 
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purpose of this rule is to increase investor awareness that investing in a money market fund 
is not without risk. 
The new regulation did not deter securities firms from establishing money market 
mutual funds. In 1992, MMFs represented $544 billion in deposits, while other mutual 
funds such as bond and equity funds managed over $1 trillion in investor funds.33 
In 1994, many money market funds experienced portfolio losses, but their investors 
were again shielded from any loss when managers made up for these losses themselves.34 
In one case, however, fund managers found themselves unable to redeem investor shares. 
Community Bankers Mutual Fund, Inc., a small MMF catering to small community banks 
had made ill-timed investments in adjustable rate securities, which lost value as interest 
rates climbed in 1993-94.  The Fund had $35.5 million of its $82.2 million in assets in 
derivatives when it was forced to liquidate its assets to redeem shares.35 This was the first 
time in the 23-year history of MMFs that a fund broke the buck, and no further failures 
would occur until 14 years later, at the height of the financial crisis in 2008.  
Arthur Levitt, Jr., then Chairman of the SEC, warned investors that there is no 
guarantee that MMFs will maintain a stable $1.00 NAV. “The moral is that any fund can 
lose money,” said Levitt. “This serves as a warning of the steps the S.E.C. needs to take to 
protect investors who are not aware of the risk they are undertaking.”36 
                                                 
33 David G. Oedel, Puzzling Banking Law: Its Effects and Purposes, 67 U. COLO. L. REV. 477, 498 (1996). 
34 In 1994, BankAmerica and 13 other banks or brokers paid $60 million to cover derivative losses in two 
money market funds. The Paine Webber Group put up $268 million to cover customer losses, and Piper 
Jaffray Companies put up $25 million in a fund that lost $700 million from derivatives. See Leslie Wayne, 
Investors Lose Money in “Safe” Fund, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 1994, at D1; Chart, “Pumping Money Into 
Their Funds,” id. at D6 (listing fifteen MMFs whose advisors covered for shortfalls in 1994 or 1994, bailing 





In the last decade or so, the biggest change in money market mutual funds has been 
the dramatic increase in the number of institutional investors in money market funds. From 
the end of 1998 to the end of 2008, retail money market mutual funds grew from 
approximately $835 billion to $1.36 trillion, or 63 percent, while institutional money 
market fund assets grew from approximately $516 billion to $2.48 trillion, a staggering 380 
















Source: Investment Company Institute 
 
FIGURE 3 
Figure 3.3: Selected Characteristics of Retail and Institutional Money Market Fund Share Classes
March 2010
Retail Institutional
Median minimum initial investment $1,000 $1 million
Median average account balance* $56,318 $4.4 million
Percentage of funds offering check writing 62% 12%
Total number of shareholder accounts 26.4 million 5.8 million
Sources: Investment Company Institute and iMoneyNet
* The median of the average account balance for each type of share class across all money market funds.
 
Source: Investment Company Institute 
 
Due in large part to the growth of institutional funds, money market mutual funds 
have increased substantially over the last decade, from approximately $1.4 trillion at the 
18 
 
end of 1998 to approximately $3.8 trillion in assets at the end of 2008.37 At the onset of the 
financial crisis, more than 750 money market funds were registered with the 
Commission,38 and money market funds accounted for approximately 39 percent of all 
investment company assets.39 
 
III. Money Market Mutual Funds and the Financial Crisis 
 
Unusually poor performance by a handful of MMFs in the wake of the financial crisis 
has sparked increased criticism of MMFs and a call for significant reforms to the existing 
regulatory structure. But no action directly taken by any MMF contributed to the credit 
crisis. And although MMFs did not escape the turbulence entirely unscathed, the 
overwhelming majority of MMF shareholders did not lose a single penny in the crisis, and 
no investors lost more than two cents on the dollar.  Of the more than $3 trillion in MMF 
assets in 2008, only a very small amount (i.e., the size of the Reserve Primary Fund at the 
time of its demise) actually resulted in losses to shareholders. 
The financial crisis is commonly understood as resulting from an unprecedented 
period of excessive borrowing and lending, particularly in the market for subprime 
residential mortgages. The crisis resulted in the collapse of many major financial 
institutions.  Among them was Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. (“Lehman Brothers”), 
which declared bankruptcy on September 15, 2008 after accruing massive losses in 
mortgage backed securities.The panic resulting from the Lehman bankruptcy spread 
                                                 
37 INV. CO. INST., 2009 INVESTMENT COMPANY FACTBOOK, supra note 6, at 146, tbl. 37. 
38 Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Money Market Fund Reform, Release No. IC-28807; File No. S7-11-09, available 




throughout the market, and soon other, normally stable institutions, including some money 
market mutual funds, came under pressure. On September 16, 2008, a MMF broke the 
buck for the first time in fourteen years when the share price of the Reserve Primary Fund 
fell below the presumptive NAV minimum of $1.00 per share.40  Over the course of the 
crisis, fund sponsors (other than Reserve Primary) made up for losses within portfolios, 
just as they had in the past.41 
Reserve Primary, the nation’s oldest MMF, had been rated ‘AAAm’ by Standard & 
Poor’s (which immediately lowered its principal stability fund rating to ‘Dm’) when the 
Fund broke the buck).42  The fund’s assets had risen 95 percent during 2008 to $125 billion, 
as investors ditched falling equity markets for safer investments. To any observer in 2007 
or early 2008, Reserve Primary looked like a safe investment fund. 
                                                 
40 Christopher Condon, Reserve Primary Money Fund Falls Below $1 a Share, Bloomberg.com, Sept. 16, 
2008, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=aAj1pHOSthQA&refer=home (last 
visited April 24, 2010). 
41 While mutual funds are not required to report all such transactions (See 17 C.F.R. 270.17a-9), in the 12 
month period prior to the collapse of the Reserve Fund, more than a dozen money fund sponsors provided 
funding to their MMF affiliates to prevent them from breaking the buck - among these were a $600 million 
bailout of the Columbia Money Funds by its sponsor, the Bank of America.  Columbia Funds were the 
seventh largest manager of money market mutual funds with over $150 billion in assets. Legg Mason, SEI 
Investments Co. and SunTrust Banks Inc. also contributed funds to prevent their MMF’s NAV from falling 
below $1.   Bloomberg, “Bank of America, Legg Mason Prop Up Their Money Funds", November 13 2007, 
available at  http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aWWjLp8m3J1I&refer=home; 
SEC Proposal 32691 at nn.39 & 40   (July 8, 2009), available at  
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/2009/ic-28807fr.pdf; Alistair Barr, “HSBC’s Bailout Puts Pressure on 
Citi, Superfund,’” MarketWatch, Nov. 26, 2007, available at http:// 
www.marketwatch.com/story/hsbcs-35-bln-sivbailout-puts-pressure-on-citi-superfund; Shannon D. 
Harrington & Christopher Condon, Bank of America, Legg Mason Prop Up Their Money Funds, Bloomberg, 
Nov. 13, 2007, available at http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/ news?pid=20601087&sid=aWWjLp8m3J1I& 
refer=home; Jim Stack, “Money Market Funds: How Safe Are They?”  Forbes, October 10, 2008, available 
athttp://www.forbes.com/2008/10/10/citigroup-morganstanley-aig-pf-guru-in_js_1010advisersoapbox_inl.h
tml. 
42 S&P rates as ‘AAAm’ those funds providing “extremely strong capacity to maintain principal stability and 
to limit exposure to principal losses due to credit, market, and/or liquidity risks.” S&P rates as “Dm” those 
funds that have “failed in [their] capacity to maintain principal stability, resulting in a realized or unrealized 
loss of principal.” Standard & Poor’s, Principal Stability Fund Ratings, 
http://www2.standardandpoors.com/portal/site/sp/en/eu/page.article/2,1,6,5,12.04845624989.html (last 
visited April 24, 2010). 
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In the year leading to its demise, however, Reserve Primary had made an investment 
decision that tied its fate to Lehman Brothers and essentially assured its destruction. In 
mid-2007, Reserve Primary began to reduce its holdings of repurchase agreements and 
bank CDs in favor of commercial paper, which it held little to none of at the time. The 
proportion of the fund’s assets in commercial paper grew from 1 percent in July 2007 to 
nearly 60 percent just one year later. (See Figure 4). In September 2008 Reserve Primary 
held $785 million of what had until then been considered an extremely safe investment: 
Lehman Brothers-issued commercial paper. In the two days before Lehman’s bankruptcy, 
the fund suffered redemptions of approximately 60%, reducing its assets to $23 billion. 
And on September 16, the day after Lehman declared bankruptcy, the fund’s Board 








Although the media instantly mourned Reserve Primary’s “failure” and “collapse,” 
the fund did not close for business on September 16, 2008.  Rather, the fund set 3:00 p.m. 
on September 16th as a cutoff time.  If a redemption request came in before 3:00 p.m. the 
redeeming shareholder promptly received the full $1.00 NAV, but any redemption requests 
after 3:00 p.m. were delayed and received a slightly reduced NAV.  And even though one 
wouldn’t get this impression in light of the regulatory response, it must be stressed that 
Reserve Primary did not entirely leave their investors in the lurch.  Rather, when the fund 
“broke the buck,” Reserve Primary’s NAV fell just three pennies, to $0.97 a share.  This 
drop occurred in two stages.  First, the NAV went to $0.99 when the 1% Lehman position 
was priced at zero.  Second, shareholder redemptions caused a further dilution of less than 
two additional cents.  Afterwards the fund was liquidated in a process overseen by the SEC.  
The distributions to date have resulted in shareholders receiving over $0.99 per share, so 
the loss has been less than one penny per share.43   
While it has been suggested that these events indicate that money market mutual 
funds are “not robust enough to withstand a major disruption,” 44  this is not the case for 
two reasons.  
 
A.  In a Properly Functioning Legal and Market Environment, Commercial Paper is 
an Investment with a Low Risk of Loss for MMFs  
 
 
Commercial paper is the trade name for short-term promissory notes that financial and 
industrial corporations issue to raise capital.45  For many years, commercial paper has 
                                                 
43 Press Release, The Reserve Primary Fund to Distribute $215 Million, (July 15, 2010), 
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comprised a substantial portion of the short-term corporate debt securities outstanding in 
the economy.   Commercial paper is used by finance companies and industrial companies 
as a low-cost substitute for bank loans to raise cash to finance current operations, 
(operating expenses), to provide working capital (i.e., to finance accounts receivable and 
inventory) and even to finance construction projects.46  Commercial paper is, “[f]or most 
large, highly rated corporations . . . the primary source of short-term credit.”47 Commercial 
paper investors are institutions with excess cash that want high-quality, short-term 
investments with a fixed, competitive rate of return.  Money market mutual funds and 
commercial bank trust departments invest in commercial paper, as do life insurance 
companies and pension funds.48 
Companies that issue commercial paper have lines of credit from banks, which they 
can access for purposes of supporting outstanding commercial paper, if necessary.  Boards 
of Directors typically restrict the amount of money that corporations can borrow through the 
issuance of short-term note obligations such as commercial paper to an amount no greater 
than the maximum amount of funds available under the company’s committed credit 
facilities at any given time.    In other words, the maximum amount of commercial paper that 
companies can issue generally cannot be greater than the amount available under the credit 
facilities.49   
                                                                                                                                                 
45 Jonathan R. Macey, Special Interest Groups Legislation and the Judicial Function: The Dilemma of 
Glass-Steagall, 33 EMORY L. J. 1, 3-4.  See also Evelyn M. Hurley, The Commercial Paper Market, 63 FED. 
RES. BULL. 525, 525 (1977); Kenneth V. Handal, The Commercial Paper Market and the Securities Acts, 39 
U. CHI. L. REV. 362, 363-364 (1972).   
46 See Thomas K. Hahn, Commercial Paper, FED. RES. BANK OF RICHMOND VIRGINIA ECON. Q., Vol. 79, no. 
2, at 45. 
47 Marc R. Saidenberg & Philip Strahan, Are Banks Still Important for Financing Large Businesses?,  
Current Issues in Econ. and Fin., FED. RES. BANK OF NEW YORK, Vol. 5, no. 12, at 2. 
48 Id. 
49Such restrictions typically appear in corporate resolutions, although sometimes these restrictions are 
reflected in corporate bylaws. 
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The point, of course, is that these bank lines of credit are available as a source of 
strength to back up commercial paper when the companies that have issued such 
commercial paper experience financial distress.50 In a typical example, in the period just 
prior to its collapse (between October 26, 2001 and November 6, 2001), Enron Corporation 
drew down its lines of credit and repurchased its outstanding commercial paper of more than 
$1.1 billion.  Many of these repurchases were made only days prior to the maturity of the 
commercial paper.51  Thus, it is clear that as long as MMFs invest in commercial paper 
issued by companies with sufficient bank lines of credit (and as long as legal risk is removed 
from the use of those lines of credit to repay outstanding commercial paper), then 
commercial paper is not a source of instability for MMFs, and thus MMFs will be able to 
withstand major dispruptions. 
 
B.  The Problems In MMFs Were Minor, Well-Managed And Were a Manifestation   
of The Crisis, Not a Cause of the Crisis.  
 
 Reserve Primary’s breaking the buck did not precipitate the crisis; it was a product of 
the crisis.52  By the time the United States District Court for the Southern District of New 
York issued an order providing for the liquidation of the fund and the pro rata distribution 
of its remaining assets on November 25, 2009 (over a year later), shareholders had already 
                                                 
50 On the one hand, the committed lines of credit that banks extend to  issuers  of commercial paper pose risks 
to the banks that extend such lines of credit and therefore the structure of the commercial paper market poses 
risks to the banking system as a whole.  However, the commercial paper market provides a significant source 
of income to the banks that participate in it.  Moreover, commercial paper is a direct substitute for bank loans, 
so that the presence of a vibrant commercial paper market in which banks participate actually reduces risk. 
See Jonathan Macey, “A Conduct Oriented Approach to the Glass-Steagall Act,”  91 YALE L.J. 102 (1981). 
51 In re Enron Creditors Recovery Corp. v. J.P. Morgan Sec., Inc., 407 B.R. 17, 21 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.2009).  
A claim that using back-up lines of credit to repurchase outstanding commercial paper can be set aside in 
bankruptcy because such payments are preferential transfers, would be highly inadvisable.  See In re Enron 
Creditors Recovery Corp.. 422 B.R. 423 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) 
52 See Edmund L. Andrews & Michael M. Grynbaum, Fed Weighs Bid to Spur Economy as Markets Plummet 
Worldwide, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 2008, at A1; Joe Nocera, 36 Hours of Alarm and Action as Crisis Spiraled, 
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 2008, at A1 (describing problems that could arise if MMFs abandoned commercial 
paper); FRANKLIN R. EDWARDS, THE NEW FINANCE: REGULATION & FINANCIAL STABILITY (1996).  
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received 92 percent of the assets they had held as of the close of business on September 15, 
2008.53  With the  January 2010 distribution of assets, shareholders have received over 99 
cents on the dollar.54 Many other financial institutions also suffered substantial losses 
resulting from Lehman’s collapse.  One cannot overstate the level of concern in the money 
markets during this timeframe that other similarly important institutions might fail.  The 
fear and near panic among investors and banks in late 2008 has been well documented.55  
In light of significant doubts as to the long-term prospects of banks and financial instutions 
around the globe, investors of all types sought to limit exposure to counterparties, and fled 
to the safety of cash or Treasury securities. As a consequence, some short-term markets 
seized up, impairing access to credit by participants in the short-term private debt market.  
By the end of September 2008, as part of the general contraction in the money markets, 
money market funds had reduced their holdings of top-rated commercial paper by $200 
billion, or 29 percent.56 
It is also true that other MMFs ran into problems during the crisis.  Money market 
mutual fund Evergreen Investments experienced losses and was bailed out by its parent, 
Wachovia.57 Putnam Investments, like Reserve Primary one of the oldest names in the 
mutual fund industry, liquidated its Putnam Prime Money Market Fund, a $12.3 billion 
fund. Although Putnam Prime had no exposure to Lehman, the fund had 35% of its assets 
                                                 
53 Press Release, The Reserve,Court Issues Order Regarding Securities and Exchange Commission’s 
Proposed Plan for Distribution of Reserve Primary Fund’s Assets (Nov. 27, 2009), 
http://www.reservefund.com/fundsnews.shtml (last visited April 24, 2010). 
54 Reserve, Reserve Primary $215 Million, supra note 43. 
55 FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMMISSION, PRELIMINARY STAFF REPORT: SHADOW BANKING AND THE 
FINANCIAL CRISIS 31-40, (May 4, 2010), available at 
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56 See Christopher Condon & Bryan Keogh, Funds’ Flight from Commercial Paper Forced Fed Move, 




in commercial paper, which is a very low-risk asset in general but  which it was required to 
sell on short notice at “fire sale” prices in order to meet unexpected redemptions from its 
concentrated institutional investor base and prevent losses for remaining investors.58  
 American Beacon Advisor, Inc.’s Money Market Select Fund also experienced 
substantial redemption requests, which it quickly satisfied by providing that all proceeds 
exceeding $250,000 in a 90-day period would be paid by making pro-rata payments of cash 
and in-kind distributions of securities held by the fund.59 Neither Evergreen, nor Putnam 
Prime, nor Select Fund broke the buck. 
Some general purpose money market mutual funds, especially institutional funds, 
experienced substantial investor flight to treasury bills and other Treasury and government 
MMFs. Over the course of the week, there was a net outflow from money market funds of 
$170 billion.   As the pace of withdrawals increased, regulators worried about the stability 
of the MMF industry and the functioning of the commercial paper market. In order to 
preserve the assets of the country’s principal purchasers of short-term debt, particularly 
commercial paper, the government acted decisively. On September 19, 2008, the Federal 
Reserve Board announced its plan to expand its emergency lending program to help 
commercial banks finance the purchase of asset-backed securities from money market 
mutual funds.60  
                                                                                                                                                 
57 Christopher Condon, Bloomberg News, Reserve Primary Money Fund Falls Below $1 a Share, Sept. 16, 
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58 Diana B. Henriques, Treasury to Guarantee Money Market Funds, N.Y.TIMES.COM, Sept. 20, 2008, 
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On the same day, the Treasury Department announced that it would guarantee all 
money market funds against losses with $50 billion from the Exchange Stabilization 
Fund.61 “For the next year, the U.S. Treasury will insure the holdings of any publicly 
offered eligible money market mutual fund – both retail and institutional – that pays a fee 
to participate in the program,” the Treasury Department said in a statement. The Treasury 
Department explained its goal to “enhance market confidence and alleviate investors’ 
concerns about the ability for money market mutual funds to absorb a loss.”62  
Modeled after FDIC insurance for bank deposits, the Temporary Guarantee Program 
for Money Market Funds (the “Guarantee Program”) was designed to be triggered if a 
participating fund’s net asset value fell below $0.995. The Treasury Department based its 
power to insure the money market on the Gold Reserve Act of 1934, the statute that had 
created the Exchange Stabilization Fund (ESF).63 This guarantee was unusual in that its 
coverage was tied specifically to balances on one day: September 19, 2008.   
Most money market funds took advantage of this program, including some of the 
nation’s largest such as Charles Schwab, Federated, Fidelity, Morgan Stanley, Putnam 
Investments, BlackRock and JPMorgan Chase.  These entities had all enrolled by October 
1, 2008, by which time investors had continued to pull cash out of prime funds and money 
market fund assets had decreased to $3.33 trillion.64  
                                                 
61 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, “Treasury Announces Guaranty Program for Money Market 
Funds” (Sept. 19, 2008), http://www.treasury.gov/press/releases/hp1147.htm (last visited April 24, 2010). 
62 Id. 
63 See Steven M. Davidoff and David Zaring, Regulation by Deal: The Government’s Response to the 
Financial Crisis, 61 Admin. L. Rev.  508 (2009) (characterizing the ESF-backed insurance program as “[a]d 
hoc, marked by a rapid response to unprecedented financial market chaos, and authorized by an 
unconventional interpretation of a Depression-era statute that created a program meant to do something 
else”). 
64 Diana B. Henriques, As Cash Leaves Money Funds, Financial Firms Sign Up for U.S. Protection, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 2, 2008, at C10. 
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The program quickly drew criticism from several organizations, including the 
Independent Community Bankers of America and American Bankers Association, who 
expected funds to drain out of bank deposits and into newly insured money funds. In any 
event, Congress acted to ensure that the program would not be attempted again. The final 
version of the EESA provided that the Secretary of Treasury was “prohibited from using 
the Exchange Stabilization Fund for the establishment of any future guaranty programs for 
the United States money market mutual fund industry.”65   
As an additional measure, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (“FRBNY”) set up 
the Commercial Paper Funding Facility to provide assistance to the commercial paper 
market by creating a special purpose vehicle that purchases commercial paper directly 
from eligible issuers. The FRBNY also created the Money Market Investor Funding 
Facility (the “MMIFF”), which provided a credit facility to qualifying private sector 
special purpose vehicles to enable them to purchase commercial paper and other money 
market instruments from MMFs, although I am not aware of any funds using the MMIFF. 
 Money market funds or their advisers paid an estimated $813 million in premiums 
under the Treasury’s Guarantee Program, but not a single claim was made under the 
program.66 By the end of February 2009, the assets of money market funds had achieved an 
all-time high of just less than $3.9 trillion. (See Figure 5). These government actions, along 
with other efforts to shore up the financial system in the face of the crisis, undoubtedly 
served to renew confidence in money market mutual funds and to stimulate new 
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investment in MMFs, although federal intervention was probably not necessary to “rescue” 




Source: Investment Company Institute 
These temporary, emergency measures were designed to complement a 
comprehensive regulatory scheme for MMFs that has existed since 1983. Although 
functionally similar to banks’ money market deposit accounts, MMFs have distinct 





IV. Advantages of Money Market Mutual Funds 
A. MMFs Diversify Risk By Reducing Pressure On The FDIC 
The structure of commercial banking is inherently fragile and susceptible to 
disruption in the form of bank runs.67 This is because commercial banks have very little 
capital compared to other sorts of companies, and because there is a structural mismatch 
between the long-term maturities of their assets and the short-term maturities of their 
deposit base. Banks’ liabilities are largely in the form of deposits that are available to their 
depositors on demand, while their assets are primarily in the form of loans with longer 
maturities. Moreover, while the deposits are maintained at a constant and immediately 
available value, banks’ assets are not only highly illiquid, but also highly opaque and 
difficult to value.  
As a result, banks do not have sufficient funds on hand to satisfy all depositors at 
once. If a substantial portion of a bank’s depositors wanted to withdraw their funds at one 
time, the bank would be forced to liquidate assets at distressed prices. Such liquidation 
would render the bank insolvent and jeopardize the interests of those depositors who were 
not attempting to maintain immediate repayment — potentially resulting in a complete loss 
of amounts deposited. As such, runs on banks can cause economic instability, requiring 
substantial regulation and monitoring. 
In order to prevent bank runs, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), a 
government corporation and independent agency created by the Glass-Steagall Act, 
provides deposit insurance guaranteeing the safety of deposits in member banks of up to 
$250,000 per depositor. The FDIC is unique among federal agencies in that it receives no 
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Congressional appropriations, but is funded exclusively by premiums that banks and thrift 
institutions pay for deposit insurance coverage and from earnings on investments in 
Treasury securities. The FDIC does have a line of credit with Treasury, which Congress 
has temporarily increased in part due to the recent stresses placed on the FDIC’s resources.  
Deposit insurance is held in the Deposit Insurance Fund (DIF), which was created with the 
merger of the Bank Insurance Fund (BIF) and Savings Association Insurance Fund (SAIF) 
in 2005. 
According to the FDIC, “[s]ince the start of FDIC insurance on January 1, 1934, no 
depositor has lost a single cent of insured funds as a result of failure.”68 In fact, Congress 
has repeatedly increased the coverage level for deposit insurance from its original figure of 
$2,500 to its present level of $250,000.  The most recent increase in the coverage level 
from $100,000 to $250,000 in 2008 was made permanent by Section 335 of the recently 
enacted Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. Even adjusted for 
inflation, the level of coverage has increased significantly over the years, representing 
approximately six times the value in real terms over the coverage level set in 1934.69 These 
increases in coverage represent de facto reductions in deposit insurance premiums, because 
the government agreed to take on significantly greater risk without increasing the 
premiums.70 The DIF’s finite resources are therefore increasingly at risk of depletion. 
The collapse of the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC) 
provides a stark warning that government insurance funds can be depleted. FSLIC, an 
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institution administered by the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB), was created as a 
part of the National Housing Act of 1934 in order to insure deposits in savings and loans, 
commonly known as thrifts. During the savings and loan crisis of the 1980’s, the FSLIC 
became insolvent.  
The savings and loan crisis of the 1980’s and 1990’s has, at least until 2008 long 
been considered the greatest collapse of U.S. financial institutions since the Great 
Depression. In the late 1980’s, the U.S. savings and loan (S&L), or thrift industry, which 
had been created in the late 19th century to support local saving and lending, essentially 
failed.71 From 1986 to 1995, the number of federally insured savings and loans in the 
United States declined from 3,234 to 1,645, primarily as a result of unsound real estate 
lending practices.72 The failure of these thrifts, which held total assets of over $500 billion, 
completely overwhelmed the resources of the FSLIC. The corporation was recapitalized 
with $15 billion of taxpayer money in 1986 and $10.75 billion in 1987. By 1989, FSLIC 
was considered too insolvent to save and was abolished along with the FHLBB. Upon the 
dissolution of the FSLIC, the corporation’s task of insuring savings and loan institutions 
was transferred to the FDIC. At final reckoning, the thrift crisis had cost American 
taxpayers approximately $124 billion and the thrift industry another $29 billion, for an 
estimated total loss of approximately $154 billion.73  
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The less pressure that is placed on the FDIC’s resources, the better. FSLIC 
collapsed, and so did the state-run deposit insurance funds of Maryland and Ohio. The 
pressure on the FDIC generally increases during times of crisis, and the last few years have 
been no exception. Despite some commentators’ belief that the financial crisis is winding 
down, banks across the country continue to collapse at an alarming rate.  Approximately 
150 FDIC-insured depository institutions failed in 2010 alone.74 
MMFs serve a vital economic purpose of relieving pressure on the FDIC insurance 
fund. The best way to counter the inherent systemic risk posed by the banking system is to 
provide investors with a viable alternative to investing in checking accounts in banks. For 
several decades, MMFs have provided an attractive alternative to checking accounts. The 
co-existence of money market mutual funds and bank checking accounts is a good 
diversification strategy for the economy and reduces systemic risk, since some people’s 
core savings will invariably be tied up in savings accounts and others will invest primarily 
in money market mutual funds.  
In addition, MMFs do not suffer from the same structural mismatch between their 
assets and liabilities that banks face.  Because of the maturity and liquidity requirements 
imposed on MMFs by Rule 2a-7 of the Investment Company Act of 1940, the investments 
made by MMFs are more closely aligned with the obligations that MMFs face when 
shareholders redeem.  Recent amendments to Rule 2a-7 strengthen these requirements 
even further by increasing liquidity requirements and shortening further the maturity 
limitations for MMF investments. 
Apart from their role in relieving pressure on the FDIC, MMFs generally provide 
value by compensating for shortcomings in bank regulation. Government guarantees of 
                                                 
74 FDIC, Failed Bank List, available at http://www.fdic.gov/bank/individual/failed/banklist.html. 
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bank liabilities are less helpful to depositors than they appear, since some, if not all, of the 
benefits of credit enhancement are eroded by the lower interest rates banks must pay for 
deposits. In fact, the primary beneficiaries of the regulatory system are the banks 
themselves, since government guarantees of their liabilities enhances their credit and 
lowers their costs of doing business.75  
Despite their dubious benefits, such guarantees rarely, if ever, meet with concerted 
political opposition. This is because the diffuse depositors who must bear the costs of these 
programs generally view themselves as beneficiaries of the schemes, which are marketed 
by bureaucrats, politicians and interest groups as consumer protection devices. Similarly, 
once a bank has collapsed, the political pressure for a government bailout can become very 
great, since the depositors have incentives to form an effective political coalition 
demanding repayment on the grounds that government supervision created a reasonable 
expectation of government protection from risk of loss.76 
Considering the political popularity of government-sponsored deposit insurance, it 
appears unlikely that Congress will scale back or repeal deposit insurance. Congress has 
never reduced the insurance ceiling per depositor, even after the savings and loan disaster 
of the 1980s.77 Accepting the phasing out of deposit insurance as politically infeasible, 
regulators should promote alternatives to savings accounts to maximize yield for investors 
as well as to reduce pressure on the finite assets of the FDIC. By competing directly with 
banks for deposits, MMFs hedge the social costs of deposit insurance as well as decrease 
the likelihood that widespread failure in the banking system would deplete the FDIC’s 
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funds and require another government bailout of the federal banking insurance industry.  
Moreover, investors have indicated that changing money market funds to a floating NAV 
will result in movement of significant assets to banks.  This potentially massive flow of 
money to banks will only increase the pressure on the FDIC, resulting in greater systemic 
risk. 
In our 1992 treatment of money market mutual funds and other “nondeposit 
deposits,” Geoffrey Miller and I noted that MMFs, as a viable substitute to savings 
accounts, provide an important benefit by challenging the dominance of depository 
institutions: 
Perhaps the most important consequence of the growth of 
nondeposits for the long-range prospects and stability of the 
banking system is that they promise to convert federal deposit 
insurance from an essentially mandatory form of social insurance, 
which persons wishing to consume economic transactions are 
forced to accept without any real choice as to whether the benefits of 
the insurance are worth the costs, into an optional system that 
consumers can utilize if they wish or can avoid if they are willing to 
incur the risks of conducting their affairs through higher yielding, 
but un-insured, transaction accounts...If deposit insurance can be 
made essentially a voluntary program, the costs of such insurance 
can then be better imposed on those wishing to obtain its benefits. In 
such a world, deposit insurance will survive if its benefits exceed its 
costs; but if the costs of deposit insurance – in terms of the moral 
hazard and subsidization of risk-taking that it creates, and the 
elaborate regulatory restraints that must be instituted to correct for 
these problems – turn out to exceed the benefits, then deposit 
insurance will wither away to a largely vestigial – and therefore 





B. MMFs Can Reduce Systemic Risk So Long As They Are Subject To Their Own 
Regulatory Scheme 
 
                                                 
78 Macey and Miller, Nondepost Deposits, supra note 70, at 272. 
35 
 
Money market mutual funds have fundamentally different assets from commercial 
banks, and therefore provide an important method for regulators and policy-makers to 
diversify the risks associated with the banking system. In this way, money market mutual 
funds are a critical mechanism for reducing systemic risk in the American financial system. 
Although there are many varying definitions of systemic risk, a common factor is 
that a trigger event causes a chain of bad economic consequences, typically a chain of 
financial institution and market failures. This is why legislation purporting to regulate 
systemic risk tends to follow hard on the heels of financial crises and market disasters, 
most notably with the passage of the Banking Act of 1933 (the Glass-Steagall Act), the 
Securities Act of 1933, and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 at the height of the Great 
Depression and the recent passage of the Dodd-Frank Act. 79  Steven Schwarcz has adopted 
the following definition of systemic risk: “the risk that (i) an economic shock such as 
market or institutional failure triggers (through a panic or otherwise) either (X) the failure 
of a chain of markets or institutions or (Y) a chain of significant losses to financial 
institutions, (ii) resulting in increases in the cost of capital or decreases in its availability, 
often evidenced by substantial financial-market price volatility.” 80  Similarly, the 
International Monetary Fund defines systemic risk as “a risk of disruption to financial 
services that is (i) caused by an impairment of all or parts of the financial system and (ii) 
has the potential to have serious negative consequences for the real economy,”81 for 
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80 Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L. J. 193, 204 (2008). 
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example, by causing a reduction in productive investment by reducing credit provision or 
destabilizing economic activity.82 
Too much homogeneity among risk-management strategies of financial institutions 
can increase systemic risk.83 In each of the three major crises of the last decade, we have 
witnessed the dangerous effects of homogenous risk management practices, where 
“competition among the major investment banks can periodically produce a mad 
momentum that sometimes leads to a lemmings-like race over the cliff. This in essence 
happened in the period just prior to the 2000 dot-com bubble, again during the accounting 
scandals of 2001-2002, and most recently during the subprime mortgage debacle.”84 Some 
scholars have posited that excessive regulation may perversely create this homogeneity.85  
Advocates of more stringent, prudential regulation of money market mutual funds 
often cite these funds’ functional similarities to checking accounts in banks. Paul Volcker, 
former Federal Reserve Chairman and head of President Obama’s Economic Recovery 
Advisory Board, has said that if MMFs “are going to talk like a bank and squawk like a 
bank, they ought to be regulated like a bank.”86 The Group of Thirty recommended that 
MMFs offering bank-like services “should be required to reorganize as special-purpose 
banks, with the appropriate prudential regulation and supervision…”87 
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Imposing identical regulatory schemes on entities with significant differences in 
institutional structure would be a mistake.  Banks and money market mutual funds have 
major structural differences requiring varied regulatory approaches.  For instance, MMF 
managers have different incentive structures, and therefore different agency costs from 
traditional bank managers, whose salaries are largely fixed.  Furthermore, MMF investors 
receive returns based on the total performance of the fund, whereas a depositor’s returns 
are largely fixed and irrespective of portfolio composition.88  
One of the principal arguments justifying bank supervision is the 
depositor-shareholder agency conflict. Under this theory, depositors are generally 
unsophisticated and have much less access to information than shareholders.  Therefore, 
depositors are generally powerless to control shareholder behavior. Although present in 
banks, this conflict is not an issue for money market mutual funds. SEC regulations ensure 
that investors in money market mutual funds do not suffer from this asymmetric 
information problem. Whereas depositors in a bank cannot easily gain information about 
the bank’s liabilities, money market funds, under the recent Rule 2a-7 amendments, will be 
required to make full holdings publicly available on a monthly basis.   
As Charles Whitehead noticed in a recent article detailing these differences, these 
characteristics make direct limits on MMFs’ investments the best tools in reducing the 
portfolio risks to which their investors are subject. In fact, and as I will discuss in Part V, 
MMFs are subject to unique limitations on what types of assets they can hold. Regulators 
seeking to instead impose banking regulations on MMFs should heed Professor 
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Whitehead’s warning that “focusing only on function is unlikely to lead to optimal 
regulation.”89 
Another principal difference between a bank deposit and a MMF involves the 
differences in credit risk that an investor assumes.  Through deposits, customers are 
exposed to one entity that is able to lend or invest as it sees fit with no disclosure 
requirements.  When investing in a MMF, the investor is buying a diversified basket of 
securities, which exposes the investor to the securities of a number of different entities, the 
identities of which are all disclosed to investors on a monthly basis.  This diversification 
decreases the investor’s credit risk particularly when compared with the bank deposit.  This 
argument applies with particular force to institutional customers with large amounts to 
invest, who may benefit only partially from FDIC insurance at banks that is capped at 
$250,000.   
 
 
C. MMFs Provide Businesses With Liquidity By Investing in Commercial Paper and 
Repos 
In a speech at the Council on Foreign Relations on March 10, 2009, Federal 
Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke noted that money market mutual fund regulation reform 
is particularly important in light of “the crucial role they play in the commercial paper 
market.” 90  Indeed, money market mutual funds provide a significant benefit to the 
economy by investing in commercial paper. MMFs are by far the largest holders of 
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on Mar. 10, 2009). 
39 
 





Taxable Money Market Funds' Holdings of 
Commercial Paper









1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009
* Data for 2010 are through March.
Sources: Investment Company Institute and Federal Reserve Board  
Source: Investment Company Institute 
 
Commercial paper is often viewed as a lower-cost alternative to bank loans. In 
commenting on the SEC’s proposed changes to Rule 2a-7 under the Investment Company 
Act and in particular on a proposal to prohibit MMFs from investing in securities that 
receive the second highest credit rating, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce stated that such a 
prohibition, “could decrease borrowing flexibility and elevate borrowing costs for [issuers 
of second-tier rated securities], thereby restricting their ability to meet their short-term cash 
                                                 
91 FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD, STATISTICAL RELEASE Z.1: FLOW OF FUNDS ACCOUNTS OF THE UNITED 
STATES: FLOWS AND OUTSTANDINGS FOURTH QUARTER 2008, at 86, Table L.208 (Mar. 12, 2009), available 
at http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/Current/z1.pdf (last visited April 24, 2010). 
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needs, increasing their cost of capital, and driving up consumer costs.”92  Once a business 
becomes established, and builds a high credit rating, it is often cheaper to draw on a 
commercial paper than on a bank line of credit. Large investors such as MMFs purchase 
commercial paper because it is relatively safe and often comports with the minimal credit 
risk determinations made by investment advisers to MMFs under Rule 2a-7. Commercial 
papers have short maturities, and most issuers have strong balance sheets and good credit 
ratings.93   
The amount of commercial paper outstanding grew dramatically in the 1980s, 
temporarily surpassing the size of the U.S. Treasury bill market in 1988.94 This is primarily 
because the interest rate on bank loans typically exceeded the rate high-quality commercial 
paper issuers paid in the commercial paper market.95 Financial disintermediation created a 
situation where corporations issued large amounts of commercial paper to investors 
moving funds away from banks. This growth paralleled the growth in MMFs, which soon 
became the primary purchaser of commercial paper. In the late 1980s, MMFs had as much 
as 50% of their assets invested in commercial paper.  
The increase in commercial paper was further aided by technological innovations. 
Computers and communication technology permitted transactions at very low costs, and 
complicated modeling permitted financial institutions such as MMFs to more accurately 
evaluate borrowers. The commercial paper market is now the primary source of short-term 
funding for investment-grade corporations. 
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Defaults on high quality commercial paper are extremely rare, which explains why 
the collapse of Lehman Brothers, which issued massive amounts of commercial paper, had 
dramatic consequences for the commercial paper market. Before Lehman’s collapse, only 
eight issuers had defaulted on commercial paper: three in 1989 (notably Integrated 
Resources), four in 1990 (notably Mortgage and Real Estate Trust), and one in 1991. In 
1991, as a result of pressure on MMFs after $883 million in commercial paper defaults, the 
SEC amended Rule 2a-7 to add a requirement that a money market fund invest no more 
than five percent of its assets in second-tier commercial paper and at most one percent of its 
assets in the paper of any particular second-tier issuer.  
In his influential article on credit rating agencies, Frank Partnoy critiqued the 1991 
amendments for encouraging credit rating agencies to sell a “regulatory license” to 
commercial paper issuers.96 After 1991, since issuers needed “first-tier” ratings in order to 
sell commercial paper to MMFs, credit rating agencies had a regulatory license to “sell” 
high ratings to such issuers. Partnoy cited Crabbe and Post’s findings that after the Rule 
2a-7 amendments forced funds to reduce their investments in medium-grade commercial 
paper, the size of the medium-grade commercial paper market declined and the yield 
spread between medium-grade and high-grade commercial paper increased by more than 
fifty percent.97 Partnoy suggests that the SEC action was an unwarranted overreaction, 
since all eight issuers that defaulted in 1989-1991 had high credit ratings and were 
considered “first-tier” issuers.98 
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 The commercial paper market was extremely stable from 1991 to 2008. As 
discussed in Part III, the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 led to 
government intervention in the commercial paper market in the form of a Federal Reserve 
Board program to lend to issuers that were unable to tap investors for cash directly.99 As of 
March 18, 2010, the market stands at $1.22 trillion in size on a seasonally adjusted basis, 
having fallen substantially from a peak of $2.2 trillion in July 2007.100Financial markets 
depend on the availability of a market for commercial paper, and if the market suffers 
further, it will become more costly and difficult for companies to obtain short-term 
financing. 
Money market mutual funds play a similarly vital role in the market for repurchase 
agreements, which compose a significant portion of the holdings of MMFs.101   Repurchase 
agreements (or repos) are contracts for the sale and future repurchase of a financial asset. 
On the repurchase date, the seller repurchases the asset at the same price at which he sold it, 
and pays interest for the use of the funds. Although legally a sequential pair of sales, in 
effect a repo is a short-term interest-bearing secured loan. The securities that the mutual 
fund purchases are considered to be collateral for the loan. The securities most frequently 
used in connection with repurchase agreements are Treasury securities and other U.S. 
Government securities.  
While the participants in the repo market are large, sophisticated institutional 
investors, the market is a very important part of the general economy.  When testifying 
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before the Financial Services Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives, Treasury 
Secretary Timothy Geithner described overnight repos as being “of critical importance to 
the economy because it is the funding basis for the traditional banking system. Without it, 
traditional banks will not lend and credit, which is essential for job creation, will not be 
created [sic].”102   
The repurchase market provides MMFs and other institutions with an attractive 
opportunity to invest their cash balances on a day-to-day basis.  Such investments direct 
short-term funds to their area of greatest need at a low cost, thereby improving the overall 
efficiency of the financial markets and the economy.  Because most repo transactions have 
a one-day maturity, they are extremely liquid and, as such, enable MMFs and other 
insitutions to deploy cash overnight on a secured basis while enabling the other party to the 
transaction to obtain overnight financing.103  Timely performance of the seller's obligation 
to repurchase is critical to these institutions, which require the funds to meet other financial 
obligations. “For such entities as state and local governments, public and private pension 
funds, money market and other mutual funds, banks, thrift institutions, and large 
corporations, repos have become a vital tool of cash management.”104  
Mutual funds, particularly money market mutual funds, invest in repos on a 
short-term basis to assist in managing their portfolios. MMFs also invest in repos in order 
to maintain a degree of liquidity in their portfolios, which is particularly important to the 
orderly operation of MMFs using the amortized cost or penny rounding methods of 
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portfolio valuation. High return with relative safety and the ability to specify term are the 
key elements of repos which make them attractive to money market mutual funds. MMFs 
are required to be highly liquid and are used by millions of investors on a daily basis for 
investment in and redemption of fund shares. The ability to redeem promptly, at net asset 
value, is crucial to the operation of these funds and the maintenance of investor confidence.  
 Like commercial paper, repos also are important in the broader financial markets. 
Repos are the principal method by which primary U.S. government securities dealers 
finance their portfolios.105 According to the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, on April 
14, 2010 the outstanding amount of repos entered into by the primary dealers for the U.S. 
government, federal agency, government sponsored enterprise, mortgage-backed and 
corporate securities was over $2.5 trillion, of which more than $1.7 trillion were overnight 
transactions. The statistic for reverse repos was just under $2 trillion. For both repos and 
reverse repos, the lion’s share were U.S. treasury securities.106 
 The repo market also plays an important role in the conduct of monetary policy. 
Repos and reverse repos have long been a principal method by which the Federal Reserve 
regulates the supply of funds. 107  The Federal Open Market Committee, through the 
Trading Desk at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, makes extensive use of repos in 
regulating the supply of funds in the execution of monetary policy.108  
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 The efficient functioning of the repo market also facilitates substantial involvement 
by foreign central banks, monetary authorities, and international institutions in financing 
the U.S. public debt. The New York Fed maintains accounts for approximately 140 foreign 
central banks, monetary authorities, and international institutions. With such large 
institutional holdings of the dollar, it has become important to the orderly financing of the 
public debt that these institutions purchase U.S. government securities. Therefore, the 
existence of an efficient repo market in government securities enhances the attractiveness 
of the U.S. dollar as an international reserve currency. 
 
V. The Current Regulation of Money Market Mutual Funds 
 
Critics of money market mutual funds claim that such funds are part of a “shadow 
banking system” that operates with “no supervision.” This is hardly true. In fact, one 
former SEC chairman has said that “[n]o issuer of securities is subject to more detailed 
regulation than mutual funds.”109 MMFs are subject to a strict regulatory scheme centered 
around SEC Rule 2a-7, which was promulgated by the SEC under the Investment 
Company Act and was substantively amended in 1991 and in 2010 to impose greater limits 
on the types of assets that MMFs can hold.  
The success of the money market mutual fund industry speaks to the credit of these 
regulations. Since the SEC adopted a special regulatory regime for MMFs in 1983, the total 
net assets of MMFs have increased eightfold, from approximately $500 million to 
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approximately $4 billion. (See Figure 7). In the meantime, MMFs only broke the buck in 
1994 and 2008, albeit with sponsor support from time to time.  
FIGURE 7 
 
Source: Investment Company Institute 
 
Adopted by the Commission in 1983, Rule 2a-7 requires all money market mutual 
funds to invest in securities that allow the fund to maintain a stable NAV.110 The rule 
intends to limit money market fund investments “to those investments that have a low level 
of volatility” and to “provide greater assurance that the money market fund will continue to 
be able to maintain a stable price per share that fairly reflects the current net asset value per 
share of the funds.”111 To this end, Rule 2a-7 governs the maturity length, credit quality, 
and diversification of assets that money  market funds can hold, providing risk-limiting 
conditions in order to reduce the likelihood that a money market fund will break the buck. 
These risk-limiting provisions all aim to minimize the deviation between a MMF’s 
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stabilized NAV and the actual market value of its portfolio by limiting the fund’s exposure 
to credit risk and interest rate risk. 
The SEC adopted amendments to Rule 2a-7 in 1991 requiring most MMFs to 
maintain a dollar-weighted average portfolio maturity of not more than 90 days. 112 
Additionally, all assets held by MMFs using an amortized cost basis must have a remaining 
maturity of 13 months (397 days) or less.113 Many commentators have suggested that the 
1991 amendments, which further restricted the ability of MMFs to buy high-yield financial 
instruments, were excessive and anticompetitive. In a 2000 speech at the University of 
Iowa Law School, former SEC Commissioner Phillip R. Lochner, Jr. expressed his regret 
for having voted for the 1991 amendments: 
 
From another viewpoint…this decision to impose economic 
regulation was a failure. By lowering the interest rates that 
some money market mutual funds were able to earn, and 
hence pass through to their customers, the SEC denied 
money market fund customers the higher returns they 
otherwise would have received. By denying less established 
issuers the opportunity to sell their commercial paper to 
money market mutual funds, the Commission raised the 
costs of capital for those companies.  
 
By reducing the ability of money market mutual funds to 
compete with banks, the SEC helped protect banks, many of 
which were widely thought at the time to be inefficient and 
sleepy, from competition by money market mutual funds.114 
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Perhaps the most significant provision of Rule 2a-7 is the rule permitting MMFs to 
use the amortized cost method of valuation and penny-rounding method of pricing. The 
basic premise underlying MMFs' use of the amortized cost method of valuation is that 
high-quality, short-term debt securities held until maturity will eventually return to the 
amortized cost value, and would not ordinarily be expected to fluctuate significantly in 
value. Therefore, the rule permits money market funds to value portfolio securities at their 
amortized cost so long as the deviation between the amortized cost and current market 
value remains minimal and results in the computation of a share price that represents fairly 
the current NAV per share of the fund. The decision to use amortized cost pricing rests 
with the MMF board, and cannot be delegated to the MMF adviser.  The role of the fund 
board in serving the interests of the shareholders is another distinguishing feature as 
compared to banks.  Likewise, both the fund’s board and the fund’s advisor owe a fiduciary 
duty to the fund’s shareholders, which requires that they act in the best interests of fund 
shareholders.  These same protections are not afforded a bank depositor.   
The premise of MMF regulation is that the term “money market” mutual fund, as 
distinct from other kinds of mutual funds, conveys a certain meaning for investors. 
Specifically, investors, it is generally understood, “expect money market funds to operate 
conservatively and maintain a $1.00 per share net asset value.”  As such the long-held view 
of the SEC is that mutual funds “should call themselves money market” only if they meet 
criteria consistent with those expectations.115 
With the regulatory goal of making sure that the term “money market mutual fund” 
retains its meaning for investors, the SEC in 2010 imposed a variety of additional 
regulatory requirements on MMFs. The SEC recently passed amendments to these 
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regulatory requirements, which will be phased in during 2010 and 2011.  The SEC 
regulates portfolio quality, diversification, liquidity and maturity requirements on any 
mutual fund that “hold[s] itself out to investors as a money market fund or equivalent.”116 
Under the recently amended rules, funds may only refer to themselves as MMFs if, among 
other requirements, they (1) invest only in securities that the fund’s board of directors 
determines present minimal credit risks; (2) are rated “in one of the two highest short term 
rating categories” by two NRSROs from a list of four NRSROs previously designated by 
the funds’ board of directors or are of comparable quality117; (3) mature within 397 
calendar days of the date they are purchased; and (4) meet certain liquidity and portfolio 
diversification requirements.  
Moreover, MMFs are generally prohibited from investing more than 5% of their 
total assets in securities from any one issuer, and MMFs cannot allocate more than 2.5% of 
fund assets to nongovernmental securities that are not in the highest rating category of the 
board-designated rating agencies. Perhaps most critically, MMFs must have “a 
dollar-weighted average portfolio maturity appropriate to its objective of maintaining a 
stable net asset value per share” and in no event can a MMF have an average weighted 
maturity that exceeds 60 days.   
MMFs are structured to offer the deposit services of banks without imposing the 
costs of reserve requirements and federal deposit insurance.118  Reserve requirements 
constitute a significant tax on the operation of depository institutions because they do not 
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generate income. Because of the Glass-Steagall Act’s separation of the securities and 
banking industries, banks cannot invest their assets in as wide a range of financial 
instruments as can MMFs.119 
In some respects, however, MMFs are more limited than banks in terms of the 
assets in which they can invest. For instance, banks invest many of their assets in financial 
markets that money market funds cannot, such as residential, car, or small business loans as 
well as bonds with long maturities (e.g., 30 years).  In accordance with SEC regulations, 
MMFs must limit their investments to high credit quality, short-term and liquid 
instruments. 
The regulatory approach for banks and MMFs are notably different. Because the 
individual investor assumes risk in the purchase of securities, the regulation of MMFs is 
premised on disclosure. Comprehensive disclosure requirements permit an investor to 
accurately assess the potential risk of an investment and then make an informed decision. 
To that end, the SEC requires that each investor receive a prospectus before purchasing 
shares in a MMF and, under the recent Rule 2a-7 amendments, that monthly disclosure of 
all holdings of the MMF will be made available to the public.  
In contrast, because commercial banks assume risk on monies they invest by 
insuring deposits, banking regulation is premised on examination. In order to ensure that 
banks meet their obligations to return principal and a predetermined interest payment to 
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depositors, state and federal regulators regularly examine the financial stability and 
business practices of banks.120 
There is another basic but important distinction between mutual funds and banks. 
Shares in a mutual fund are not debt instruments. The fund does not promise to pay back 
the investor at any specified value, but rather commits to redeem investments based on the 
fund’s NAV at the time of redemption. Whereas banks set an administered rate, MMFs 
provide a market return. Interests in a mutual fund are thus a form of demand equity rather 
than demand debt. This feature means that a run on mutual funds is unlikely (and helps 
explain why such runs have been quite rare when compared to bank products). Even if a 
customer hears troubling news about a mutual fund in which he or she has invested, there 
may be little advantage to redeeming shares immediately because he or she will receive 
only a pro rata share of NAV. There may be a marginal advantage nonetheless for 
participating in a run on a mutual fund because of concern that NAV will decrease during a 
run as a result of emergency liquidation of assets to meet customer demand. However, the 
highly safe asset base and highly liquid nature of MMFs -- which are even more safe and 
more liquid under the SEC’s recent Rule 2a-7 amendments -- make such liquidations 
extremely rare occurrences. Furthermore, the new rules give the boards of MMFs the 
ability to suspend redemptions if necessary.  
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VI. Proposed Reforms to Money Market Mutual Fund Regulation 
 
The Obama administration has strongly endorsed reform of money market mutual 
fund regulation. In March 2009, Fed Chairman Bernanke encouraged policymakers to 
“consider how to increase the resiliency of those funds that are susceptible to runs” by 
“impos[ing] tighter restrictions on the instruments in which money market mutual funds 
can invest, potentially requiring shorter maturities and increased liquidity,” and 
“develop[ing] a limited system of insurance for money market mutual funds that seek to 
maintain a stable net asset value.”121 In October 2010 the President’s Working Group on 
Financial Markets (PWG) responded with a report on ways of further regulating money 
market funds beyond the regulatory amendments already instituted by the SEC. 
The money market fund reforms recently adopted by the SEC included several 
important changes to 2a-7. To constrain the risk-taking of MMFs, the SEC reduced the 
maximum weighted average portfolio maturity permitted by the rule to 60 days, and 
limited the weighted average life maturity of portfolio securities to 120 days. The new 
regulations also permit MMFs breaking the buck to suspend redemptions promptly so as to 
avoid causing panic. Finally, the rules place more constraints on repurchase agreements 
between MMFs and third parties. 
The SEC has also sought comment on other possible reforms, “recogniz[ing] that the 
events of the last two years raise the question of whether further and perhaps more 
fundamental changes to the regulatory structure governing money market funds may be 
warranted.”122 During the January 27, 2010 Open Meeting, Chairman Schapiro mentioned 
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five possible reforms – floating NAV, more frequent disclosure of mark-to-market NAV, 
redemptions in-kind, a private liquidity facility and a two-tiered system of MMFs. Each of 
these alternatives was analyzed by the PWG in its October 2010 report. The most 
controversial of them is the proposal to require money market mutual funds to have a 
“floating” NAV or a NAV that moves daily in line with the value of the fund’s underlying 
investments, rather than the stable $1.00 NAV prevalent today.   
Along with the reforms suggested by Chairman Shapiro, several further reform 
options were assessed by the PWG. 123  First, the PWG considered creating private 
emergency liquidity facilities for MMFs, which would buttress MMFs’ ability to withstand 
capital outflows. Second, the PWG considered requiring that MMFs distribute large 
redemptions in kind rather than in cash so as to limit liquidity costs to shareholders. Third, 
the PWG considered some form of government insurance on MMFs to limit the risk of runs 
on MMFs. Fourth, the PWG considered different ways of creating a two-tier system of 
MMFs with different provisions for stable NAV MMFs, as suggested by Chairman Shapiro. 
Fifth, the PWG considered regulating stable NAV MMFs as special purpose banks. Finally, 
the PWG contemplated enhanced constraints on MMF substitutes that are currently 
unregulated. 
Both current regulation and many of the PWG’s future regulatory proposals, 
particularly the proposal to float the NAV, are premised on the empirically verifiable 
assumption that people think MMF accounts are either (1) protected by the government; or 
(2) completely safe for some other reason such as guarantees by the fund families.  Survey 
research by private firms should be done to verify this claim. If these assumptions are false, 
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the solution is to improve investor education, not to abandon the very structure of the MMF 
industry. 
Regulators should therefore aim to accomplish three goals before instituting these 
reforms: (1) compile empirical research on what money market mutual fund investors 
think they are risking when they invest in money market mutual funds; (2) further investor 
education about MMFs to reduce whatever low levels of misinformation are out there; and 
(3) ensure that the rules we have for MMFs are effective in reducing the susceptibility of 
funds to breaking the buck. 
There has been very little empirical research on the customer’s perception as to 
whether or not money market mutual funds are insured. The most frequently cited evidence 
of customer confusion stems from an SEC survey released in November 1993.124 The 
study showed that a large percentage of the public believes that all mutual funds are 
FDIC-insured, including mutual funds sold by traditional mutual fund companies.125 Of 
the 1,000 households surveyed, 47% owned fund shares, 28% erroneously believed that 
mutual funds sold by banks are federally insured, and 49% believed that money market 
mutual funds sold by banks are federally insured.126 Most surprisingly, 36% of those 
surveyed believed that mutual funds bought by a stockbroker are federally insured.127 
Another survey, conducted by the North American Securities Administrators 
Association and the American Association of Retired Persons, polled 1,000 adults in 
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October 1993 who said they regularly used a commercial bank.128 Of those who had 
purchased mutual funds from a depository institution, 85% remembered being given a 
disclosure document. Nevertheless, 52% of this group still thought their mutual funds were 
FDIC-insured.129 
Since these studies, however, MMFs have substantially increased in size and 
popularity, and it is reasonable to assume that the general non-investing public has become 
more educated about mutual funds and that customer confusion has lessened significantly. 
Furthermore, in the seventeen years since this study, the demographics of investors in 
MMFs have changed substantially. Whereas retail investors held the majority of MMF 
assets in 1993, in recent years the balance has shifted to institutional investors, who are 
more sophisticated and generally demand greater access to market information. At present, 
$2.5 trillion in MMF assets (65%) are held in institutional-share classes, almost twice as 
much as the $1.4 trillion (35%) held in retail-share classes. (See Figure 2). Institutional 
investors now hold roughly 7 million shareholder accounts in MMFs, with a median 
minimum initial investment of $1 million. This can be compared with 31 million retail 
investor accounts, with a median minimum investment of $1,000. (See Figure 3). 
Some commentators have argued that investors generally believe that money 
market mutual funds are equivalent to holding cash in a deposit account.130 Admittedly, 
there are both superficial and substantive similarities between MMFs and MMDAs, which 
result from the original development of MMFs as a substitute for checking accounts and 
the subsequent development of MMDAs as a reactive effort by depository institutions to 
                                                 




compete with MMFs.  However, investors in MMFs are explicitly warned that investments 
in money market mutual funds are not equivalent to holding cash in a deposit account, and 
that they are not insured by the federal government. Money market mutual fund sponsors 
are required to disclose to their customers that agencies of the United States government 
neither insure nor guarantee investments in the fund, and that their investments may lose 
principal.131 SEC rules require money market mutual funds to disclose, verbatim: 
 
An investment in the Fund is not insured or guaranteed by 
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation or any other 
government agent. Although the Fund seeks to preserve the 
value of your investment at $1.00 per share, it is possible to 
lose money by investing in the Fund.132 
 
These disclosures must be prominent not only in prospectuses, but also in any sales 
literature or advertisements issued by money market mutual funds. This language seems to 
be sufficiently clear in providing notice to investors that they could lose money in these 
funds. Of course, it could be amended to make an explicit distinction between bank 
accounts and MMFs, as some commentators have suggested.133 Additionally, the SEC 
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could require that fund sponsors send a regular notice to investors reminding them that 
MMFs are not insured and bear a risk of loss of principal.134  
The SEC has recently adopted a rule that will require MMFs to provide monthly 
website disclosure of portfolio holdings, which should allow third-party analysts and 
commentators to compare MMFs and flag certain aspects of MMF portfolios, both positive 
and negative. 135  Third-party analysis will hopefully guide disclosure of the risk 
characteristics of particular money market funds, and raise a general awareness that 
investments in MMFs are not necessarily as safe as cash in a bank. 
Proponents of a floating NAV argue that by intervening in support of MMFs in 
September 2008, the federal government gave investors reason to believe that MMFs are, 
in fact, as safe as cash. If the federal government did indeed confuse investors, a better 
solution than requiring a floating NAV would be explicit assurance to investors that MMFs 
are not as safe as cash and that there is no guarantee of a government bailout. The recent 
financial crisis was an extraordinary circumstance, which witnessed unprecedented federal 
intervention into financial markets, and investors will certainly understand that there was 
nothing routine or habitual about the emergency liquidity programs the government put in 
place during the financial crisis, just as investors recognize that the major government 
intervention in other financial markets was an extraordinary occurrence. 
Even assuming that customers believe that MMFs are insured by the government, 
regulators can adopt safeguards that would increase customer awareness without risking 
systemic damage to the economy. However, it is my opinion that the institutional investors 
who comprise a majority of the investors in MMFs are aware that MMFs are not insured. 
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Furthermore, within the mutual fund industry, MMFs offer investors a wide range 
of choices. Investors can invest in worldwide funds that are aggressively seeking the 
highest yields from investments around the world, money funds that invest only in 
Treasury securities, tax-exempt funds that invest only in tax-free securities, or general 
purpose funds that invest in CDs, commercial paper, repo transctions or any variety of 
short-term investments. Generally, MMFs with the least credit risk are the ones invested in 
securities backed by the full faith and credit of the U.S. government. As with all mutual 
funds, the risk in MMF investing depends on the quality of the investments that make up 
the portfolio of any particular MMF. Investors are therefore already in a position to choose 
a MMF with a yield and risk appropriate to their needs. 
Investors and fund managers have argued persuasively against the adoption of a 
floating NAV, and for good reason. The proposal to no longer permit money market 
mutual funds to quote a stable NAV of $1.00 would, by definition, eliminate the existence 
of mutual funds that can quote a stable asset value. This would result in a massive inflow of 
money to banks, which would in turn increase systemic risk, reduce the current level of 
diversification with respect to how assets are held, and disrupt very long-settled patterns of 
corporate finance, particularly in the markets for commercial paper and repos.  
A stable $1.00 NAV provides convenience and simplicity to investors and managers 
alike, boosting MMFs’ efficiency with regard to tax, accounting, and recordkeeping. 
Unlike other mutual funds, MMFs are used primarily as a cash management tool, which 
means that large transactions flow through them every day. Without a stable NAV, many 
                                                                                                                                                 




investors will bolt for other cash management entities offering a stable NAV in order to 
minimize tax, accounting, and recordkeeping burdens. 
At the Investment Company Institute’s Mutual Fund and Investment Management 
Conference in Phoenix in March 2010, Paul Schott Stevens, the organization’s president 
and chief executive officer, criticized the SEC’s proposal for a floating NAV. Stevens 
emphasized the ICI’s strong opposition to eliminating a steady net asset value of $1 per 
share, a fundamental feature of money markets. “Make no mistake: forcing these funds to 
‘float’ their NAV will destroy money market funds as we know them,” Stevens said. “It 
will penalize individual investors and exact a high price in the American economy. But it 
will not—repeat, not—reduce risks to the financial system. By any measure, it is a bad 
idea.”136  
Stevens noted that mutual funds that float their NAV are not immune to redemption 
pressure, noting that floating-value funds “lost half their assets in the course of 2008. 
Clearly, the experience of these other funds demonstrates that a fluctuating per-share value 
would not eliminate the possibility of wholesale redemptions from money market funds 
during a future crisis.”137 
Stevens expressed his conviction that a floating NAV would cause both institutional 
investors and small investors to leave MMFs: 
 
As one institutional investor has told us, ‘If a money market 
fund is not dollar-in, dollar-out, you won’t have my dollar.’ 
Indeed, many institutions are required by law or by 
investment policy to keep cash in stable-value 
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accounts…[I]nstitutions that want or require stable value 
would probably turn to the true “shadow banking system” – 
private pools, here and overseas, that promise to maintain a 
fixed price. These alternatives would neither be registered 
with the SEC nor subject to regulation under the Investment 
Company Act 1940, including Rule 2a-7. They would not 
assure investors the same protections that money market 
funds do with respect to credit quality, maturity, liquidity, 
and other aspects of portfolio management. Investors will be 
more likely—not less—to withdraw their assets from such 
funds in a future crisis. In short, forcing money market funds 
to float their values would kill these funds as we know 
them—without reducing systemic risk. In fact, it seems 
highly likely that the world would be a riskier place for 
investors, for issuers, and for the markets.138  
 
The PWG has now joined these critics of the floating NAV proposal. Though the 
PWG acknowledged three ways in which the switch to a floating NAV might help reduce 
the systemic risk posed by MMFs to some extent,139 it ultimately concluded that a floating 
NAV could be expected to disrupt the everyday functioning of the $3 trillion MMF 
marketplace. In particular, the PWG hypothesized that the floating NAV reform would 
result in lower investor demand, which would reduce the capacity of MMFs to provide 
short-term credit to businesses, financial institutions, state and local governments, and 
others. 140  Additionally, the PWG anticipated that investors would seek stable NAV 
investment alternatives – like offshore MMFs, enhanced cash funds, and other vehicles 
that are not subject to the ICA’s restrictions on MMFs – alternatives that may pose more of 
a systemic risk than MMFs because they are less regulated or entirely unregulated. Finally, 
the PWG considered other side effects that might follow from the transition from stable to 
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floating  NAVs.  In particular, a floating NAV could undermine risk management practices 
as MMFs would no longer need the discipline required to maintain a stable $1 share price. 
The PWG is correct in predicting that a floating NAV would lead investors to 
switch out of MMFs. MMFs arose outside of the banking structure in order to provide a 
better match between the maturity of the assets and the liabilities than bank checking 
accounts, and to take advantage of Rule 2a-7 regulation. Permitting MMFs to use the 
amortized cost pricing valuation method pursuant to Rule 2a-7 further enabled them to 
compete with banks. If money market mutual funds are required to price their assets like a 
regular mutual fund, they will completely lose their competitive advantage. Eliminating 
this characteristic strips MMFs of what made them a successful enterprise, causing them to 
go from being different to being disadvantaged. In summation, requiring money market 




A deep and well-functioning money market is important to the well being of the 
macro-economy. The ICI estimates that the size of the money market, including the 
outstanding values of short-term, instruments such as commercial paper, large CDs, 
Treasury and agency securities, and repurchase agreements, totals roughly $12 trillion.141  
Requiring MMFs to float their NAVs and so break the buck, or subjecting MMFs to 
a bank-like regulatory structure would disrupt not only the commercial paper and repo 
markets, as discussed in Part IV, but also other parts of the short-term money market and 
increase systemic risk.  MMFs hold approximately 23 percent of all repurchase agreements, 
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65 percent of state and local government short-term debt, 24 percent of short-term 
Treasury securities, and 44 percent of short-term agency securities, including securities 
issued by Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and the Federal Home Loan Banks. MMFs are also 
central players in broader capital markets, holding approximately 22 percent of all state 
and local government debt, approximately nine percent of all U.S. Treasury securities and 
15 percent of all agency securities.142 
As the SEC mentioned in the proposed rule, “the health of money market funds is 
important not only to their investors, but also to a large number of businesses and state and 
local governments that finance current operations through the issuance of short-term 
debt.”143 State and local governments rely on tax-exempt MMFs to fund essential public 
projects such as roads, bridges, airports, hospitals, and low-income housing. According to 
the ICI, as of December 2008 tax-exempt MMFs had $491 billion of short-term state and 
municipal debt under management.144 
Although risk-limiting reforms are important to ensure the continued safety and 
security of MMFs, major revisions such as the floating NAV requirement or bank-like 
regulation would destabilize an industry that has been remarkably stable. In the 39-year 
history of MMFs, fund managers have “broken the buck” on extraordinarily few occasions.   
In conclusion, the strength and singularity of money market mutual funds requires 
an amortized value calculation for determining net asset value. Destabilizing the NAV 
would also destabilize the mutual fund industry, the commercial paper market and the repo 
market, while placing broader capital markets in substantial and unnecessary danger. 
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